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INSURABLE INTEREST IN LIFE.
III.
INSURANCE EFFECTED ON THE LIFE OF ANOTHER.
Insurance effected on the life of another differs materially
-from insurance on one's own life in that the interest requisite
is necessarily special, and not general. An examination of
such insurance should disclose the nature of an insurable
interest and make it possible to formulate a definition.
We must begin with the Statute 14 Geo. III. c. 48. This
enacted that "no insurance shall be made . . on the life ...
of any person . . . wherein the person . . . for whose use,
benefit, or on whose account such policy . . . shall be made,
shall have no interest." What this interest must be, was left
to the courts to determine.
The question arose first for decision in Ha/ford v. Kymer,
io B. & C. 724 (1830), where a father had insured the life of
his son. Payment of the fund was refused by the insurers on
the ground of lack of interest, and in this they were sustained,
the court holding that the interest must be pecuniary in its
nature. Mere love and affection, then, for a member of one's
family will not suffice in England. This decision is unques-
tioned there, and has been followed repeatedly: Barnes v.
London, Edinburgh & Glasgow L. Ins. Co., [1892] I Q. B.
864. A definite pecuniary interest must always be proved,
unless, perhaps, in the case of a policy taken out by a wife
upon the life of her husband. There it will be presumed:
Reed v. Royal Exchange Ass. Co., Parke's Add. Cas. 70 (1795),
.per Lord Kenyon.
The American courts have been inclined to take a much
more liberal view of the matter, governed as they are, and
solely in most cases, by their conceptions of the requirements
of public policy; yet often the idea of an accompanying pecu-
niary advantage is present in their minds. This advantage
need not, apparently, be either certain or definite, nor of the
nature stated by Lord Eldon in Lucena v. Crawford, 2 B. &
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P. N. R. 269 (I8O6), to be necessary in the case of insurance
on goods; it will be sufficient in most jurisdictions if a close
relationship be joined to a reasonable hope of gain from the
continuance of the life. There are not wanting dicta to the
effect that even less than this will answer. Thus, in Corson's
Appeal, I 13 Pa. 438 (1886), Clark, J., says at p. 444: "An
insurable interest is not necessarily a definite pecuniary interest,
such as is recognized and protected at law;" and Bradley, J.,
says: " Indeed, it may be said generally that any reasonable
expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage from the con-
tinued life of another creates an insurable interest in such
life :" Conn. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaeffer, 94 U. S. 457 (1876);
Kentucky L. & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 63 Fed. (C. C. A.) 93
(1894).
No authorities need be cited to prove that a creditor may
insure the life of his debtor to secure his debt, for this is one
of the oldest uses of life insurance. It has been said, how-
ever, that such policies differ from others in that they are
contracts of indemnity: Fox v. Penn. 37. L. .CO., 4 Big. L. &
A. Ins. Rep.459 (1874),per Sharswood,J.,in the District Court
of Philadelphia. This cannot be true as concerns the insurer;
it must be restricted to claims for the surplus of the fund by
the debtor or his representatives: Dalby v. . & L. L. Ass. Co.,
15 C. B. 365 (1854); Goldbazim v. Bhtm, 79 Tex. 638; 15
S. W. Rep. 564 (1891).
A distinction is drawn in cases of creditors' policies between
those effected by the creditor absolutely for his own protec-
tion and benefit, and those under an agreement of the parties
for collateral security, the debtor paying the premiums. The
rule governing the latter is stated most clearly by Stuart, V.-C.,
in Courtenay v. [Mrigzit. 2 Giff. 337 (i86O). (See Lea v.
Hinton, 5 DeG., M. & G. 823 (1854); Drjysdale v. Piggott,
8 Id. 546 (1856). Cf. Le-or v. Taylor, 66 Tex. 652 (1886)).
"\Vhere the relation of debtor and creditor subsists, and the
true construction of the instruments and the evidence of the
real nature of the transaction shows that the policy of insurance
was effected by the creditor as a security or indemnity, if the
debtor directly or indirectly provides money to defray the
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expense of that security, he is on a principle of natural equity,
entitled to have the security delivered up to him when he pays
his debt, which it was directly or indirectly at his expense
effected to secure." To this Lord Hatherly, L. C., adds:
"The court requires distinct evidence of a contract-that the
creditor has agreed to effect a policy and that the debtor has
agreed to pay the premiums, and in that case, the policy will
be held in trust for the debtor:" Bruce v. Garden, L. R. 5
Ch. App. 32 (1869). (Cf. Amick v. Butlcr, III Ind. 578
(1887)). As regards the creditor, then, this is substantially a
contract of indemnity, and it was so regarded by the Supreme
Court of the United States in C6roty v. Union Of Ins. Co., 144
U. S. 62-1 (1891).
The general rule when the creditor himself pays the pre-
miums and there is no agreement that the debtor shall be at
liberty to redeem the policy, (Matthews v. Sheehan, 69 N. Y.
585 (1877); Tathum v. Ross, I5o Mass. 44o (189o)), is that
the fund belongs to the creditor: Freme v. Blade, 2 DeG. & J.
582 (1858); Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438 (1886). This is
but just, and the objection sometimes urged that it permits the
creditor to be paid his debt twice is utterly fallacious. The
debt is his in any event, and the policy has been purchased by
the payment of premiums calculated on the chances of the
debtor's life and not of his solvency: Law v. London I. L. P.
Co., I K. & J. at 229 (1855); Ferguson v. M1fass. M. L. Ins.
Co., 32 Hun (N. Y.) 3o6 (1884). To allow the representa-
tives of the debtor to claim from the creditor the fund mints
the expenses (and the debt, if that is yet unpaid) is to put all
the chances of loss upon the creditor. If his debtor dies soon,
the creditor reaps no benefit-if the premiums and their accu-
mulated interest consume the fund, as they must more often
than not, his security for the debt is gone. We shall have
occasion to examine the question more at length in treating of
the "quantum of insurable interest.
This subject of creditors' policies shows clearly the necessity
of understanding properly the nature of the contract, for after
the interest had ceased to exist no recovery could be had,
were the contract one of indemnity as regards the insurer:
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Supra, p. 66. No distinction seems to be drawn between
interests indefinite in duration-e. g., that of debtor and
creditor-and those necessarily limited, like. the one in Law v.
London! . P. Co., I K. & J. 223 (1855). Inthis case, a father
purchased from his son a legacy contingent on the son's
attaining thirty years of age. When the son wanted twenty
months of that age, the plaintiff applied to the defendant com-
pany to insure his son for that time. It appears to have been
the custom of the company to insure only for even terms of
years, and the insurance accordingly was effected for two
years. The son attained thirty, but died before the term of
the policy had expired. The company refused payment,
alleging lack of interest, though they had been informed of the
circumstances and had themselves suggested the two-year
term. It was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.-C. (afterwards
Lord Hatherly, L. C.) that the failure of interest was imma-
terial, provided there had been a sufficient interest at the
inception of the risk. "The policy never refers to the reason
for effecting it. It is simply a contract, that in consideration
of a certain annual payment, the company will pay at a future
time a fixed sum calculated by them with reference to the
value of the premiums which are to be paid, in order to pur-
chase the postponed payment. Whatever event may happep
in the meantime is a matter of indifference to the insurers.
They do not found their calculations upon that, but simply
upon the probabilities of human life, and they get paid the full
value of that calculation .... The company, therefore, got a
full value in premiums for that insurance for two years, and,
accordingly, I cannot, in the least, doubt what should be the
result. . . . The whole of this case shows perfect bona fides
on the part of the plaintiff. I do not think I can say that the
plaintiff is within the words or the spirit of that enactment
[I4 Geo. III. c. 48], he having an interest in the life, and the
insurance having been effected in the manner I have described."
Fraud, of course, will vitiate the contract-thus one with a
day's interest could hardly be allowed to insure the entire life,
and the question of a bonafide interest or one merely color-
able would, necessarily, be left to the jury.
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Another illustration of a pecuniary interest of determinate
duration is that of a surety on an official bond. Thus, in the
case of Scott v. Dickson, io8 Pa. 6 (1884), it does not appear
from the report for what term the office was held, yet Paxson,
J. (see p. 14) was of the opinion that insurance might be
effected for life. The law on this subject is stated most
clearly in Sides v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., I6 Fed. Rep. 650
(1883), in the Circuit Court of Tennessee by Hammond, J.:
"Where there is, to begin with, an adequate insurable inter-
est, which demonstrates that the parties are not seeking to
evade the prohibition against gambling policies, whether we
go by a statutory or Common Law prohibition, the insurer
must pay according to the contract, and it is no concern of his,
unless the policy provides against these misadventures, that
there may have been, before the death occurred, a diminution
or entire cessation of insurable interest. The surplus, if any,
may or may not, according to the circumstances in each case,
go to the personal representatives of the deceased, when the
remaining interest of the assured is satisfied; but it is now,
since Godsall v. Boldero was overruled, never a defence to the
insurer that the interest of the policy-holder has lessened or
ceased."
These are the principles that control such cases as Rawls v.
American A. L. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282 (1863) and Ferguson
v. Mass. M. L. Ins. Co., 32 Hun (N. Y.) 306 (1884). In the
first, the policy was in form taken out by the debtor on his
own life with the creditor as beneficiary, but it was the creditor
who applied for the policy and paid the premiums. As we
have seen, this makes a policy equivalent to a policy taken
out by the creditor, as regards the requirement that he be
interested in the life. While the court so construed it, they
allowed a recovery, though the debt was barred by the Sta-
tute of Limitations and the policy contained a clause that no
more should be recovered than the debt. This provision was
held not to defeat recovery, for the insurance company could
not take advahtage of a plea open to the debtor alone. The
contract, therefore, was not so much an insurance of a debt,
as a promise to pay upon the termination of the life. The
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facts in Ferguson v. 17ass. X. L. fis. Co., 32 Hun (N. Y.) 306
(1884), were similar, save that here the creditor had received
his discharge in bankruptcy, and the debt, of course, was
definitely gone.
Apart from the direct relation of debtor and creditor, it
may be said generally that when the death of a person would
entail upon another the risk of pecuniary loss, such other will
have an interest which he may protect by insurance, subject,
of course, to the rule stated above with regard to the duration
of the interest. The two cases just cited are excellent illustra-
tions. In Sides v. Knickcrbocker Ins. Co., 16 Fed. 56o (1883),
premises were leased in which the landlord had but a life
interest. It was held that the chance of losing the lease
through the premature death of the landlord gave the tenant
an insurable interest in the landlord's life. In Scott v. Dickson,
io8 Pa. 6 (1884), the action was analogous to a bill of inter-
pleader to determine the ownership of the fund, the contention
being, on behalf of the insurer's administrator, that no interest
existed in a surety on a bond before any breach had taken
place. It was said by Paxson, J.: " When Mr. Scott became
Mr. Dickson's bail on his official bond, he had an interest in
his life, which he could have protected by taking out a policy
directly thereon. That he was never called upon for payment
upon this bond is not to the purpose; he might have been; he
was liable for any breach of it, and this liability constituted an
interest in the life of Dickson, and this interest existed at the
time of the alleged assignment of the policy."
Another form of interest often before the courts is that of a
partner. The leading case is Conn..17 L. Ins. Co. v. Luchs,
io8 U. S.498 (1882). (Cf Cheeves v. Anders, 25 S. W. (Tex.)
324 (1894)). A. and B. formed a partnership, towards which
each was to contribute $5,ooo. B. did not pay in his share
and A. insured his life to that amount. Lack of interest was
one of the grounds of the company's defence, but Field, J.,
said: "Certainly Luchs had a pecuniary interest in the life of
Dillenburg on two grounds: because he was his creditor and
because he was his partner. The continuance of the partner-
ship, and, of course, a continuance of Dillenberg's life, fur-
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nished a reasonable expectation of advantage to himself. It
was in the expectation of such advantage that the partnership
was formed, and, of course, for the like expectation, was con-
tinued." The authorities cited by the court in support of this
last point are three : Jlorrell v. Trenton Jll. L. & F. Ins. Co.,
io Cush. 282 (1852); Trenton .1. L. & F. Ins. Co. v.Johnson,
4 Zab. 576 (1854). (already cited at length upon the subject
of interest requisite at the Common Law, sipra p. 75) and
Bezin v. Conn. AL L. Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244 (1854). The
facts of these cases were substantially the same. A man de-
sirous of going to Caiifornia in the days of the gold excitement
of '49 would agree to share his earnings with some one at
home, in returpi for assistance in procuring an outfit. Insurance
would then be effected on his life for such an amount as the
parties pleased, and several times the question arose whether
these were not mere wagering contracts. Their validity, how-
ever, was sustained when the amount was reasonable, the court
saying, in Morrell v. Trenton O. L. & F. Ins. Co., IO Cush.
282 (1852), "He had a subsisting contract with that person,
made on a valuable consideration, by which he was to receive
one quarter part of his earnings in the mines of California for
one year. Such an interest cannot, from its nature, be valued
or apportioned. It was an interest upon which the policy
attached. By the loss of his life within the year, the person
whose life was insured lost the means of earning anything
more, and the plaintiff was deprived of receiving his share of
such earnings to an uncertain and indefinite amount."
The case of Hebdon v. l Vest, 3 B. & S. 578 (1863), will
serve to mark the limits of these interests. A banker's clerk
had been lent money by his employer and was told that the
loan would not be demanded during the banker's life. His
salary, also, was raised and was to continue at the increased
figure for the term of seven years. The clerk obtained insur-
ance on the banker's life, with the permission of the latter.
Wightman, J., held that the expectation of not having to repay
the loan while his employer lived could give no insurable in-
terest-there was no consideration or circumstance of any kind
to make such a promise binding, and it did not give even an
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appreciable interest in the life, much less a pecuniary one as
required by the Statute. But the other interest was sufficient.
This is not necessarily in conflict with the dictum of Bradley,
J., that "any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit will
suffice": Conn. -il. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaeffer, 94 U. S. 457
(1876), but should it be so regarded, it would seem more in
consonance with the views of public policy expressled by the
courts. Certainly it is not so open to abuse.
Many other cases might readily be cited, e. g-., agreements
to raise a child or keep a person till death, but it is needless
further to multiply examples of the various forms of pecuniary
interest on which policies may be effected; the same principle
underlies them all, that death will cause a loss to the assured.
We turn now to a consideration of interest arising from
relationship, though with small hope of extracting much from
the confusion of the authorities. Its very existence is denied
by some-relationship is regarded rather as evidence of theprob-
able existence of an insurable interest than as in itself giving
rise to it. Thu-; May (§ 107) says : " Relationship seems not to
be of importance except as tending to give rise to the circum-
stances that justify a well-founded expectation of pecuniary
advantage firom the continuance of the life insured or risk of
loss from its termination." And Bliss on Insurance, § 3 1, is
to the same effect. This is, of course, based upon authority
and it has been followed by various courts, notably in Illinois,
Indiana and Missouri; opposed to it are many decided cases
and still more dicta.
Why there should be this difference of opinion is not evi-
dent. The reason for requiring an interest is, of course, to be
found in public policy ; now, if a pecuniary interest will pre-
vent gambling of this sort, will not natural love and affection ?
If a man is rich his death may be much more to his heir's
advantage than his life. The pecuniary interest will not avail
public policy here. And if a man is poor, often nothing but
natural love and affection exists, apart from the ordinary con-
siderations of the law, to prevent his murder. It is a some-
what curious fact that natural love and affection are recognized
very generally as sufficient in the Federal courts and in those
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of the Eastern States, while those of the Central and Western
States incline rather to the basis of the pecuniary interest. But
mere friendship, however intimate, is never recognized as the
basis for a policy: Condell i. TWoodward, 29 S. V. Rep. (Ky.)
714 (1895).
To examine, first, the opinions of the more important
courts, it will be convenient to cite first the language of Brad-
ley, J., in the leading case of Conn. M. L. Ins. Co. v. Sclkaeffer,
94 U. S. 457 (1876) :
" Precisely what interest is necessary, in order to take a
policy out of the category of mere wager, has been the subject
of much discussion. In marine and fire insurance, the diffi-
culty is not so great, because there insurance is considered as
strictly an indemnity. But in life insurance, the loss can sel-
dom be measured by pecuniary values. Still, an interest of
some sort in the insured life must exist ..... .The essential
thing is, that the policy shall be obtained in good faith, and
not for the purpose of speculating upon the hazard of a life in
which the insured has no interest. On this point, the remarks
of Chief Justice Shaw, in a case which arose in Connecticut
(in which State the present policy originated), seem to us
characterized by great good sense. He says: ' In discussing
the question in this Commonwealth (Massachusetts) we are to
consider it solely as a question of Common Law, unaffected by
the Statute of 14 Geo. III., passed about the time of the com-
mencement of the Revolution, and never adopted in this State.
All, therefore, which it seems necessary to show, in order to
take the case out of the objection of being a wager policy, is,
that the insured has some interest in the cestti que vie ; that
his temporal affairs, his just hopes and well-grounded expec-
tations of support, of patronage, and advantage in life, will be
impaired; so that the real purpose is not a wager, but to
secure such advantages, supposed to depend on the life of
another; such, we suppose, would be sufficient to prevent it
from being regarded as a mere wager. Whatever may be the
nature of such interest, and whatever the amount insured, it
can work no injury to the insurers, because the premium is
proportioned to the amount; and whether the insurance be a
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large or small amount, the premium is computed to be a pre-
cise eqluivalent for the risk taken. We cannot doubt,' he
continues, ' that a parent has an interest in the life of a child,
and vice versa, a child in the life of a parent; not merely on
the ground of a provision of law that parents and grand-
parents are bound to support their lineal kindred when they
may stand in need of relief, but upon considerations of strong
morals, and the force of natural affection between near kindred,
operating often more efficaciously than those of positive law':
(Loomis v. Eagle Lif"2 ins. Co., 6 Gray, 399). We concur in
these views.'
The question litigated in this case was the right of a wife to
insure her husband ; and this is, therefore, in great measure a
dictum, yet it represents very fairly the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court. Thus Clifford, J., had said in Is. Co.
v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 (1871), that "a policy is not invalid
.as a wager-policy, if it appear that the relation, whether of
consanguinity or of affinity was such, between the person
whose life was insured and the beneficiary named in the
policy, as warrants the conclusion that the beneficiary had an
interest, whether pecuniary or arising from dependence or
natural affection, in the life of the person insured."
We may compare with this the definition of Field, J., in the
later case of VMariock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 (1881): "It
may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest,
arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance,
eitlr as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties
of blood, or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expec-
tation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life.
It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit
should be always capable of pecuniary estimation; for a parent
has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in
the life of his parent, a husband in the life of his wife, and a
wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases
of this kind is considered as more powerful-as operating more
efficaciously-to protect the life of the insured than any other
consideration. But, in all cases, there must be a reasonable
ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each
INSURABLE INTEREST IN LIFE.
other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some
benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the
assured. Otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by which
the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early
death of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create
a desire for the event. They are, therefore, independently of
any statute on the subject, condemned, as being against public
policy." It is interesting, here, to note in passing the curious
confusion of terms, the insured being spoken of as the assured,
and vice versa.
These expressions of opinion have been very generally cited,
and may be said fairly to represent the views of those courts
that admit the sufficiency of interest arising from relationship.
It now remains to examine a few cases in those courts, to see
what the degree of the relationship must be, and a few cases
in other courts, to see from what relationship a pecuniary
interest is inferred.
Marriage will not, in general, give rise to an interest, save
only in the case of husband and wife. The husband's interest
may be based upon his right to her consortium, for any injury
to which he would have had his action of trespass at Common
Law; however, like hers in him, it may not unreasonably be
looked upon as a natural consequence of the love and affection
a husband and wife must be presumed to bear towards each
other. (Cf. Con. Of. L. Ins. Co. v. Schacffer, 94 U. S, 457
(1876); Corson's App., 113 Pa. 438 (1886)). The subject of
insurance for the benefit of married women is now regulated
by statute in very many of the States. These statutes provide
usually that such policies shall be exempt from any claims
against the husband's estate: (See 25 Amer. L. R(7v. 185
(1891)); often, indeed, the maximum amount is limited, or
what may be paid annually in premiums.
In this connection, we may refer very briefly to a leading
United States case, Mashington Central Bank v. Hume, 128
U. S. 195 (1885), and an article upon it by Professor Willis-
ton, in 25 Amer. L. Rev. 185 (I89i), as illustrating a wife's
interest in her husband's life. The question involved was her
right to hold the fund when premiums upon insurance on his
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life had been paid by an insolvent husband. The court
awarded the whole fund to her on the ground, inter alia, that
the policy rested mainly on her interest in his life. The appli-
cation for one of these policies, it may be noted, was in her
name, but the court appears not to have recognized any dis-
tinction between the principles involved in the several cases.
All depend upon her interest. The distinction drawn is
" between the transfer of a policy taken out by a person upon
his insurable interest in his own life, and payable to himself or
his legal representatives, and the obtaining of a policy by a
person upon the insurable interest of his wife and children,
and payable to them "-this, says Fuller, C. J., has been
repeatedly recognized by the courts. The first is void, as
against creditors under the Statute 13 Eliz., c. 5 ; concerning
the second, the court says: " Conceding, then, in the case in
hand, that Hume paid the premiums out of his own money
when insolvent, yet, as Mrs. Hume and the children survived
him, and the contracts covered their insurable interest, it is
difficult to see upon what ground the creditors, or the admin-
istrators as representing them, can take away from these
dependent ones that which was expressly secured to them in
the event of the death of their natural supporter. The inter-
est insured was neither the debtor's nor his creditors'. The
contracts were not payable to the debtor, or his representatives,
or his creditors. No fraud, on the part of the wife, or the
children, or the insurance company, is pretended. In no sense
was there any gift or transfer of the debtor's property, unless
the amounts paid as premiums are to be held to constitute
such gift or transfer ..... .But, even though Hume paid
this money out c f his own funds when insolvent, and if such
payment were within the Statute of Elizabeth, this would not
give the creditors any interest in the proceeds of the policies,
which belonged to the beneficiaries for the reasons already
stated."
This raises the question of the creditors' right to recover
the premiums. " The premiums form no part of the proceeds
of the policies and cannot be deducted therefrom on that
ground," nor can they be on the ground that they were gifts
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unlawfully made. " This argument in the interest of creditors
concedes that the debtor may rightfully preserve his family
from suffering and want. It seems to us that the same public
policy which justifies this, and recognizes the support of wife and
children as a positive obligation in law as well as morals,
should be extended to protect them from destitution after the
debtor's death by permitting him, not to accumulate a fund as a
permanent provision, but to devote a moderate portion of his
earnings to keep on foot a security for support already, or
which could thereby be lawfully obtained, at least to the
extent of requiring that, under such circumstances, the fraudu-
lent intent of both parties to the transaction should be made out.
"And inasmuch as there is no evidence from which such
intent on the part of Mrs. Hume or the insurance companies
could be inferred, in our judgment none of these premiums
can be recovered."
This result is severely criticized by Professor Williston: 25
Amer. L. Rev. 185 (1891).
Three possible dispositions of the fund, he finds from an
examination of the authorities, have been suggested :
(I) The wife is entitled to the whole of the proceeds;
(2) The wife is entitled to the whole of the proceeds less the
amount of the premiums paid after insolvency;
(3) The wife can derive no benefit whatever from such a
policy.
We will venture to suggest a fourth-that the wife is entitled
to the surrender-value of the policy at the time of insolvency.
We have not space to examine Mr. Williston's article at
length; all the authorities are reviewed, and his conclusion is
that the principle of the following of trust funds is applicable
here. The creditors, therefore, may follow the premiums into
the policy which they have been the means of creating or
preserving as well as into land or stocks; accordingly, the
creditors are entitled to the premiums paid during insolvency,
if the policy was taken out before insolvency, and to the
whole fund if the policy was taken out after it. The statutes,
he says, may regulate the matter as the), will, but their very
existence is an admission of the Common Law rule.
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The suggestion that the wife is entitled only to the surrender-
value of the policy at the time of insolvency is based upon the
principle that the beneficiary has a vested right in the fund.
A premium is regarded as a gift and the beneficiary cannot, in
general, be changed at will : Biddle on Ins. § 285 ; Mashing-
Ion Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 198 (1885). The sur-
render-value at the time of insolvency belongs to the wife, for
it could then have been demanded of the insurer ; everything
realized in excess of this is the product of moneys devoted to
this use during insolvency ; therefore, if the creditors can
object to such payments of premiums and the doctrine of the
following of trust funds applies, it would seem that this excess
might well be awarded to the creditors.
Examining further interests arising from relationship, it
appears that a father has an interest in his son's life: Loomis
v. Eaglc Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396 (1856), and sice versa:
Reser'e Jf. L. fins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Pa. 154, (1876). In the
latter case, the court declares : " It would be technical in the
extreme to say that a son has no insurable interest in his
father's life." The cases cited are express authorities in sup-
port of these propositions, and to them might be added many
weighty dicta both in the United States Supreme Court and
elsewhere. (Cf. Conn. JL. L. fits. Co. v. Schaefer; WVarnock
v. Davis ; lashington Central Bank v. Hume ; Loomis v.
Eaglc Ins. Co.; Corson's A9ppeal, etc., supra ; Grattan v.
N'ational L. Ins. Co., 15 Hun (N. Y.) 74 (1878)).
Even when these relations arise from adoption, it would
seem an interest exists: Hodge v. Ellis, 76 Ga. 272 (1886);
and such an interest exists in the life of one standing in loco
parentis toward the assured: Car pcnter v. U. S. L. fits. Co.,
I6 Pa. 9 (1894) ; in these cases, however, a pecuniary interest
is usually present as well.
Many of the dicta referred to will be found to assert an
interest in lineals, but no case has been met with that directly
decides this point on the basis of natural love and affection.
The relationship of brother and sister has been said to be
on the border-line, and with the present paucity of authorities,
it is difficult to say whether it will suffice or not. The trouble
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comes from the fact that almost all the cases seem to be com-
plicated by a pecuniary element that alone would give an
interest. ThusinLordv. Dall, 12 Mass. 115 (1815), thebrother
whose life was insured, was the sole dependence of his sister;
Keystone !. B. Ass'n. v. Beaverson, 16 W. N. C. (Phila.,,C. P.)
(1885), is the converse of this-a brother insured the life of
his sister, whom he had supported without any expectation of
repayment. Aetna Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U. S. 561 (1876),
seems to be the only case deciding the point in favor of such
an interest, yet even here it may well be said that the ques-
tion did not arise; the policy was by one on his own life, and
only the arrangement for the payment of the premiums would
call for an interest in the beneficiary.
No interest would seem to arise from the relation of uncle
or aunt and nephew or niece: Corsons' Appc-al, I 13 Pa. 438
(1886), nor, in fact, from any such collateral relationship:
Riner v. Id., I66 Pa. 617 (1895). It has been held in Penn-
sylvania that a step-son has no interest in his step-father:
Union B. AI. A. Soc. v. JMlacDonald, 122 Pa. 324 (1888), and
to judge from the language of Clark, J., there is such an
absolute lack of interest that no question of motive or bona
fides can arise.
The principle underlying these cases appears to be that
love and affection for the members of one's own immediate
family of the whole blood will in these jurisdictions be pre-
sumed to exist, sufficient to comply with the requirements of
public policy in the avoidance of wagers.
The cases in the courts where a pecuniary interest is
required under all circumstances, need not detain us long.
;Many courts, indeed, prefer to rely rather on this element
when it is present, and Loomis v. Eagle L. Ins. Co., 6 Gray
396 (1856), is based upon both grounds. The same may be
said of Kane v. Ins. Co., 31 L. I. 196 (874). An adult son
had insured his father's life and the court held that aside from
the mere ties of kindred he had a right to protect himself
against the contingency of having to support his mother and
brothers. The extreme to which the rule may be carried
appears in the case of Cur-er v. ContinentalL. Ins. Co., 57 Vt.
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496 (1884), where it was said by Taft, J.: "\We think that
where no facts are shown in relation to the wife, the presump-
tion is that the husband has an insurable pecuniary interest in
her life, for he is entitled to her services; there are many
cases where she is the real support of the husband and family.
In all ordinary cases, the husband has, in fact, a deep inter-
est in the continued life of the wife. Cases may exist where
the husband has no interest whatever in his wife's life-she
may be a burden, a hopeless maniac or an invalid, and such
facts may require the application of a different rule. Ordi-
narily, we hold the presumption to be that the wife is a help-
mate, and the husband has an interest in her living of a
pecuniary nature."
Even before marriage a man and his future wife have a
pecuniary interest in each other, arising from the contract and
its anticipated advantages : Corson's Appea, supra; Cidsloim
v. N. C. L. Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213 (1873). In this latter case,
a woman insured her fianc6, paying the premiums herself, and
he died before marriage. The court held that an uncertain
interest like this was sufficient, and suggested that she might
have had an action against him, had there been a breach of
the contract.
In general, a strong probability of pecuniary advantage to
be derived from the continuance of the life will be required by
these courts just as if no relationship existed. Thus a father
can insure a minor son, for he is entitled to the latter's earn-
ings, and a son can insure his father, if he is, by law, entitled
to support and maintenance if in need ; but a grandson cannot
insure his grandfather: Burton v. Conn. H. L. Ins. Co., is
Ins. L.J. 713 (1889); nor a man his brother or his mother-
in-law: Lewis v. Ins. Co., 39 Conn. 100 (1874); Rombaclt v.
Piedmont & Arlington Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 233 (1883), for
here no such liability to support exists. Nor can an uncle
insure his nephew or vice versa: Singleton v. St. L. .11f Ins.
Co., 66 Mo. 63 (1877), in which many authorities are re-
viewed.
The rule is unquestionably often a harsh one, as in .Jichicll
v. National L. Ins. CO., 45 Me. 104 (1858), where it was held
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that a father could not insure the life of his son, unless he still
had a claim to his services, or a relation of debtor and creditor
subsisted. The rule had its origin, doubtless, in the evils of
the so-called 'graveyard insurance," yet we cannot but feel
that in many cases it might profitably be relaxed.
The question of the quantum of insurable interest is of im-
portance. The courts have declared repeatedly that if one
holding- an interest of trifling value insure it for a dispropor-
tionate sum, this will be gambling as much as is insurance
without interest.
In England, the Statute 14 Geo. III., c. 48, § 3, provided
that " no greater sum shall be recovered or received from the
insurer or insurers than the amount of value of the interest of
the insured." This was construed in Hebdon v. JJ'est, 3 B. &
S. 578 (1863). The plaintiff had a pecuniary interest in the
insured, and had taken out a number of policies thereon,
aggregating much more than his interest. One insurer de-
fended, on the ground that the plaintiff had already received
on other policies more than his interest, and the plea was
sustained upon demurrer. The court held that, ,though,
upon a life policy, the insurable interest at the time of making
the policy, and not the interest at the time of the death, is to
be considered," the original interest is the limit of recovery.
The interest may be fully insured for greater security in each
of several companies, as is sometimes done in marine insur-
ance, but only a single recovery is permissible. This pro-
vision of the Statute makes the contract strictly one of
indemnity during the continuance of the interest, as regards
moneys received from the insurers. It will be noticed that
the Statute does not refer to moneys received from other
sources, and the insurers remain liable, therefore, to the full
amount of the original interest, even if the interest has termi-
nated or the loss been made good aliunde.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, the question
arose in Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643 (1872), and a policy
for S3000 to cover a debt of S7o was declared "a sheer
wagering policy." The rule there laid down was stated more
succinctly in Conn. Jthit. L. Ins. CO. v. Sclacffer, 94 U. S.
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457 (1876): " In cases where the insurance is effected merely
by way of indemnity, as where a creditor insures the life of
his debtor for the purpose of securing his debt, the amount of
insurable interest is the amount of the debt." This has often
been cited, as in CI'O&T v. Ulion Jf Ins. CO., 144 U. S. 621
(1891).
A more liberal rule has been adopted in Texas, and perhaps
some other States, where a creditor may insure his debtor's
life to any reasonable amount, and reimburse himself for his
expenses in carrying the policy: Levy v. Talor, 66 Tex. 652
(I886); Goldbaum v. Blum, 79 Tex. 638; i5 S. W. Rep.
564 (189i).
What discrepancy is permissible has been examined recently
in Pennsylvania, in U/rich v. Reinoehl, i43 Pa. 238 (1891). A
creditor accepted a policy of $3,000 on the life of an insolvent
debtor in satisfaction of a debt of $Ioo, and the claim was
made against the creditor by the debtor's executor that the
contract was a wager. Paxson, C. J., referred briefly to the
earlier cases, explaining that they furnished no satisfactory
guide, and then proceeded to an examination of the question.
We quote at length from his opinion :
" It is settled law that a creditor has an insurable interest in
the life of his debtor, but up to this time there is no decision
as to the limit of this right ..... .Starting out with the
conceded proposition that a creditor has an insurable interest
in the life of his debtor and may lawfully take out a policy
thereon, it follows logically that he may take out the policy
in such a sum as may reasonably secure the debt. It needs
no argument to show that if my debtor owes me one thousand
dollars, a policy for one thousand dollars would be inadequate,
for if my debtor dies within twenty-four hours after the policy
is taken out, I am a loser by the amount of the premium paid,
and it would be but a few years before the interest on the debt
and the premiums would exceed the debt. Every future pay-
ment, then, would be a loss, with the only alternative of add-
ing to this loss year by year or abandoning the policy alto-
gether, and sinking the whole amount paid. It seems clear
upon reason that the creditor may take out a policy in excess
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of his debt. But to what excess ? The answer to this ques-
tion obviously depends upon circumstances. An important
element in the consideration of this question is the age of the
assured. The difference between a policy on the life of a man
of twenty-five years of age and one of seventy-five -is clear to
the dullest understanding. The assured was only forty-two
years of age, and his expect'ancy of life was twenty-six years.
The chances were greatly in favor of his living out his expect-
ancy. The Carlisle Tables were prepared with care by com-
petent experts, and are the result of actual experience. I
am, therefore, justified in saying that the chances were in
favor of the assured living out his expectancy, in which case,
there would be the loss of interest on the debt for twenty-six
years, added to the dues and assessments with interest thereon
for the same period. The evidence shows that in such an event,
the defendants would have been losers by a considerable sum.
In fact, I infer from thel tables furnished, that after about
seventeen years the defendants would have carried this policy
at a loss. The defendants assumed this risk when they' took
out the policy.. .
In order to ascertain whether an insurance is dispropor-
tioned to the debt, regard must be had to the age of the
assured, his expectation of life, and the cost of carrying the
insurance, with interest thereon, as x-:ell as upon the amount
of the debt. The evidence which forms the subject of the first
assignment was not only proper but essential to an intelligent
understanding of the case ......
The rule we now announce may not be the best, but we
have not been able to find a better, after a most careful and
anxious consideration of the question. . . . We are of opinion
that a creditor may lawfully take out a policy on the life of
his debtor to an amount sufficient to cover the debt with in-
terest, and the cost of such insurance with interest thereon,
during the period of the expectancy of life of the assured ac-
cording to the Carlisle Tables."
The creditor's only hope of gain is in the early decease of
his debtor. It is obvious, taking into account the debt itself
and the interest thereon-compound interest it should be,
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accurately to represent the expense of the insurance-and the
premiums and the interest thereon, that if the debtor die very
soon a comparatively slight excess of insurance above the debt
will make the creditor whole. But the odds are much against
this. In an average case, the premiums and interest thereon
will theoretically equal the face of the policy if the insurer's
profit be disregarded; therefore only the premiums and in-
terest charges saved by a premature death can be applied to
the satisfaction of the debt and all its accumulated interest.
As we approach the calculated expectancy of life, more nearly
to equalize the chances of death, the number of premiums so
applicable is decreased and the interest charges are increased,
until finally a single premium with the interest for one pre-
mium-period upon the premium-account must almost equal
the debt with the interest charges thereon. And this calcula-
tion disregards the insurer's profits. By this time the insur-
ance has become so great as to defeat its own object if the
debt is of any magnitude, yet the debtor must die at least one
premium-period before his expectancy merely to make the
creditor whole. This means that the odds must always be
against the creditor.
The assumption, of course, on which this calculation is based
is that the policy is newly issued and that the creditor and the
company can invest their money to the same advantage. It
need hardly be said that the matter is radically different when
an old policy is taken by assignment as security for the debt.
Such a policy has already acquired a surrender-value and the
premiums are smaller than they would be on a new one. This
discussion, too, does not apply to insurance effected for a short
and definite term to protect a debt. The purpose of such in-
surance is really indemnity, obtained by accepting a small and
certain loss which will guard against a threatened and greater
one. A further analogy to fire and marine insurance consists
in the fact that death is not a certain event within the term of
the policy, as it is in insurance upon the whole life, and the
premiums, therefore, are less than the corresponding premiums
on a life-policy tinder the " level-premium " system.
The practice of taking out an insurance policy in payment
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of a debt appears, therefore, to be fallacious. As between the
insurer and the assured, the matter is even enough-the pre-
miums represent the value of the insurance with a commission
for services and, perhaps, something towards a reserve fund,
and, in an average case, neither party can really be said to
make a profit out of the other. The difficulty comes from the
fact that the creditor's chances are always weighted down by
the debt and its interest account.
From this it appears that under the prevailing system of
insurance it is a mathematical impossibility to reach the limit
set by the court in Uiricl4 v. Reinorlil, which is the limit that
should be reached to give the assured complete protection;
the conclusion, therefore, is forced upon us that no insurance
of a creditor, whatever be the amount, can properly be cor-
sidered excessive. This result, of course, is very unsatisfac-
tory; the insurance must be greatly in excess of the debt to
avoid almost certain loss, and when the insurance is suffi-
ciently large to accomplish this, the cost is such that a court
impressed with the dangers of insurance on life might well be
inclined to impose a limit unduly restricted.
The question of the disposition of the fund when the bene-
ficiary has no insurable interest in the life of the assured, or
his interest is inadequate, is hardly relevant to an inquiry into
the nature of an insurable interest, It may be stated, how-
ever, that, in general, the contract will be enforced as regards
the insurer, but the beneficiary will be considered a trustee of
the fund or of its surplus for the benefit of the personal repre-
sentatives of the insured. There is some conflict in the
decisions, but it is believed that this statement of the law is
sustained by the. weight of authority in the Federal and State
courts.
From this review of the subject, the American courts appear
to have differed widely in regard to the true nature of an
insurable interest in life. The legislatures have interfered but
little in the matter, and this branch of the law is, therefore, in
great measure, judge-made; like the Rule against Perpetuities;
it has been developed from time to time as necessity required,
and the development has naturally varied in the courts of so
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many jurisdictions. All the courts are agreed that an insur-
able interest is such an interest as a sound public policy
requires one to have in the life of another before lie may
effect insurance thereon, "to prevent gambling on the chances
of human life," but no satisfactory definition has yet been
given. Mr. Biddle does not attempt one, but thinks (Biddle
on Ins. § 187) that " we must conclude with Hoar, J., that in
America ' the question, what is such an interest in the life of
another as will support a contract of insurance upon the life,
is one to which a complete and satisfactory answer, resting
upon sound principles, can hardly yet be said to have been
given:' Forbes v. American M. fns. Co., I5 Gray (Mass.), 249
(I86o)."
The difficulty is doubtless due, at least in part, to the
effect of relationship between the parties. In many jurisdic-
tions, as has been shown at length, relationship gives rise to
an interest, but on various grounds; in some jurisdictions,
this interest is attributed to the natural love and affection sub-
sisting between members of a family; in some, to the pecuniary
interest that must be presumed to exist or that exists through
the operation of statutes imposing the duty of affording sup-
port; in others, no effect whatever is conceded to it.
Some of the courts, notably the Supreme Courts of the
United States, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, have attempted
elaborate definitions, of which the more important have already
been quoted, but apparently none has yet been elaborated that
is wholly satisfactory to the court enunciating it. The text-
writers, as a rule, refrain from formal definition (see flfay on
Ins., Cooke on Ins., Bliss on Ins., Beach on Ins., etc.), and
quote these definitions and the accompanying dicta with the
statement that a really good definition of an insurable interest
seems impossible. In fact, many of those attempted are really
descriptions.
The best, perhaps, are to be found in Bunyon on Lfe Assui-
ance. § [2, stating the English rule, and in Richards on Insm-
ance, § 27, stating the result of the American cases dependent
upon a pecuniary interest.
"An insurable interest must be pecuniary; no ties of love
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or affection are sufficient. The interest must arise out of some
subsisting right of property which may be prejudicially effected
by the occurrence of the event insured against, and which,
whether in possession, in reversion, or contingent, would give
the assured a standing in a Court of Equity if the title were
in question:" Bunyon on L. Ass., § 12.
"Every person has an insurable interest in the life and
health of himself, on any person on whom he depends wholly
or in part for education or support, of any person tinder a
legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or respect-
ing property or services of which death or illness might delay
or prevent the performance, and of any person upon whose
life any estate or interest vested in him depends:" Richards.
on Inzs,, § 27.
Erskine Haaard Dickson.
